* Abstract-Safeguards and security systems for nuclear facilities include material control and accounting (MC&A) and a physical protection system (PPS) to protect against theft, sabotage and other malevolent human acts. The insider threat is most often addressed as part of the evaluation of a facility's PPS. A PPS is evaluated using probabilistic analysis of adversary paths on the basis of detection, delay, and response timelines to determine timely detection. Because insider adversaries have access to, knowledge of, and authority for facility operations, the PPS actually provides minimal protection against the insider threat. By monitoring and tracking critical materials, MC&A activities are an important protection element against inside adversaries. Timely detection for MC&A activities, however, has been difficult to determine so that for the most part, the effectiveness of these activities has not been explicitly incorporated in the insider threat evaluation of a PPS. This paper presents research on a new approach to incorporate MC&A protection elements explicitly within the existing probabilistic path analysis methodology. MC&A activities, from monitoring to inventory measurements, provide many, often recurring opportunities to determine the status of critical items, including detection of missing materials. Human reliability analysis methods for nuclear power plant operations are used to determine human error probabilities to characterize the detection capabilities of MC&A activities. An object-based state machine paradigm was developed to characterize the path elements and timing of an insider theft scenario as a race against MC&A detection that can move a facility from a normal state to an alert state having additional detection opportunities. Event sequence diagrams describe insider paths through the PPS and also incorporate MC&A activities as path elements. To address the insider threat, this work establishes a probabilistic basis for timely MC&A detection and methods to evaluate the effectiveness of MC&A activities explicitly within the existing path analysis methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The safeguards and security (S&S) protection system for a nuclear facility includes both a physical protection system (PPS) * Sandia National Laboratories is a multi program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Company, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
Approved for unclassified/unlimited release. and material control and accounting (MC&A). The performance of a PPS is evaluated using probabilistic analysis of adversary paths on the basis of detection, delay and response timelines to determine timely detection. The path analysis methodology focuses on a systematic, quantitative evaluation of the physical protection components of the system for potential external threats, and often calculates the probability (P E ) that the PPS is effective in defeating an adversary who uses that attack pathway. MC&A elements, however, have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the path analysis methods. Explicitly incorporating MC&A protections into the existing S&S system evaluation provides the basis for an effectiveness measure for insider threats, and the resulting insider and outsider P E calculations together provide an integrated effectiveness measure that addresses both types of threats.
Insiders represent the most capable of potential security threats to any organization. An insider is defined as anyone with knowledge of, access to, and authority at a facility. This definition implies that every employee in an organization is an insider, and any employee may pose an insider threat. Contractors, suppliers, vendors, and even visitors may also pose an insider threat. Of concern is a malicious insider who might attempt theft of critical assets, sabotage of equipment or operations, or other criminal activities. For theft or diversion of material, malicious insiders represent formidable threats because they have knowledge of and access to target materials and may interact directly with the target without being detected as well as take advantage of system vulnerabilities and opportunities to circumvent system elements. Detection and delay timelines are not as relevant because insiders can choose the most opportune times and optimum strategies, often using protracted or discontinuous attacks. One strategy for addressing the insider threat would be to optimize the control and accountability of materials, and to more fully incorporate MC&A elements into the evaluation of the S&S protection system.
MC&A operations for monitoring, measuring and tracking material at nuclear facilities provide critical information about target materials and are a key protection approach against the insider threat. Some system elements support both the PPS and MC&A protection systems (for example, automated surveillance and personnel access control), and some MC&A protections are already incorporated, although perhaps not explicitly identified as such, in the current approach to evaluating a PPS (for example, material transfers from one PPS layer to another). Other MC&A elements, however, have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the path analysis methods that are used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site's protection system.
The insider threat is most often addressed as part of the evaluation of a facility's PPS. A PPS is evaluated using probabilistic analysis of adversary paths on the basis of detection, delay, and response timelines to determine timely detection. Because insider adversaries have various levels of access to, knowledge of, and authority for facility operations, a PPS actually provides minimal protection against the insider threat. Timely detection for MC&A activities, however, has been difficult to determine so that for the most part, the effectiveness of these activities has not been explicitly incorporated in the insider threat evaluation of a PPS.
This paper presents a new approach to incorporate MC&A protection elements explicitly in the existing probabilistic path analysis methodology [1] . Previous work [2] observed that many MC&A activities have "sensing" characteristics with alarm and assessment capabilities of a detector. Characterization of MC&A activities as having detection capabilities is the basis for incorporating MC&A activities as additional sensors in a site's protection system. This work has established a probabilistic basis for extending the existing path analysis method to incorporate the additional detection capabilities of MC&A activities. Human reliability analysis (HRA) methods provide the basis to determine an appropriate probability of detection (P D ) for MC&A protection elements and the formulation of timely MC&A detection. This paper reviews the extended path analysis methods and summarizes analyses for one MC&A activity and multiple PPS layers and for a set of MC&A activities through multiple PPS layers. Calculations of the values for each of the probabilistic parameters required to determine the probability of timely detection for a one MC&A activity in a single PPS layer for a single timeline are presented in [3] . The analyses demonstrate the extended path analysis for evaluation of insider threats and how operational strategies might be considered for mitigating the insider threat.
II. HUMAN RELIABILITY METHODS FOR MC&A ACTIVITIES
For HRA as a part of nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) Swain and Guttmann [4] developed a handbook that includes methods, models, and estimated human error probabilities (HEPs) to address human performance of NPP operations. Within the handbook, the authors address checking operations as recovery factors for which dependency is an important characterstic. A recovery factor is defined as "an element of an NPP system that acts to prevent deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects" [4, p. 19-1] .
Human redundancy is a type of recovery factor that occurs when one person checks his or her own work or another person's work, detects an error that has occurred and corrects it. The handbook describes a variety of checking operations used in an NPP.
A. MC&A Activities as NPP Checking Operations
MC&A activities have many characteristics similar to operator tasks performed in an NPP in that the reliability of these activities depends significantly on human performance. Many of the procedures involve human performance in checking for anomalous conditions. As an example, checking the status of a valve in an NPP is similar to checking the status of target material in a vault. The respective associated anomalous conditions are that a valve should be closed but is partially or completely open (perhaps after a maintenance activity), and that a target in a vault is not where it should be located. Both can be characterized as checking procedures, in which an identified checking opportunity exists, and a person discovers or fails to discover an anomalous condition. Further characterization of MC&A activities as procedures that check the status of critical assets provides a basis for applying HRA models and methods to determine probabilities of detection for MC&A protection elements. Table 1 [4] . These estimated BHEPs can be applied to MC&A protection elements -P D is defined as the complement of the BHEP for performing a given MC&A activity.
B. Dependence of Recurring MC&A Activities
Within a PPS, sensor elements are designed to detect unauthorized activity. This work has provided additional insights to the characterization of MC&A activities as sensors within a site's protection system.
MC&A activities are actually interwoven within each protection layer of a PPS and provide additional detection and delay opportunities within the S&S protection system. These activities are important protection elements against insider theft and can serve to discourage malicious insider activity. They provide many, often recurring opportunities to observe the status of critical items (e.g., daily administrative checks). For example, Table 2 lists a notational set of MC&A activities that are performed on a recurring basis. A year-long detection opportunity timeline can be constructed from the compilation of the recurrence of these activities and demonstrates the importance of these activities as protection elements against insider threats.
In this work, MC&A activities have been characterized as a type of human redundancy recovery factor. Generally, MC&A activities would be considered independent events. However, because many of the MC&A activities are recurring, it is important to consider and to understand the dependence between the recurrences of the same activity or between the occurrences of two different activities and whether they are performed by the same or different persons. Dependence is a characteristic used in HRA methods to consider how the success or failure of a subsequent task depends on the success or failure of the immediately preceding task.
Equation 1 provides the failure equation that is used to calculate the conditional probability of failure on Task M given failure on the previous Task M-1 for different levels of dependence. The general formulation for the failure equation is: Nuclear Power Plant Checking Operation BHEP Checking routine tasks using written materials 0.10 Checking that involves active participation, such as special measurements 0.01 Special short-term, one-of-a-kind checking with alerting factors 0.05 Special short-term, one-of-a-kind checking with alerting factors 0.05 Checking routine tasks using written materials 0.10 Checking by reader/checker of the task performer in a two-man team, or checking by a second checker, routine task 0.50
Checking by reader/checker of the task performer in a two-man team, or checking by a second checker, routine task 0.50
Checking routine tasks using written materials 0.10 Checking that involves active participation, such as special measurements 0.01 Checking that involves active participation, such as special measurements 0.01 where a ranges from 0 to . Values of a equal to , 19, 6, 1, and 0 correspond, respectively, to points of zero, low, moderate, high and complete positive dependence [4, Equations 10-14 through 10-18].
To explore dependence that may generally be associated with recurring MC&A activities, the failure equation for the positive dependence model from Swain and Guttmann [4] was applied for one daily MC&A activity that occurs over a 30-day period. Figure 1 shows how the daily probability of MC&A detection varies across five different levels of dependence for a low (0.02) initial probability of detection (complement of the BHEP for a type of NPP operation associated with a specific MC&A activity). This plot demonstrates how, in most cases of human performance, it is expected that a person performing a recurring activity has a decreasing likelihood of successfully detecting an anomaly given that the previous opportunity has failed. With no dependence between recurring MC&A activities, the initial probability of detection is maintained over the 30-day timeline. The decrease in probability of detection for each subsequent recurrence of the same activity or of two activities, however, will vary with the level of dependence between the two activities.
III. TIMELY DETECTION
With the existing path analysis method, detection, delay and response timelines for a PPS are evaluated to determine timely detection. For each path, the probability P E is calculated to determine if the PPS achieves timely detection and is effective in defeating an adversary who uses that attack pathway. This work has developed several elements to provide a probabilistic basis for extending the existing path analysis method to incorporate MC&A activities [5] .
In the extended methodology, an object-based state machine was developed as a basis for characterizing insider theft as a race analogous to the characterization of an outsider attack as a race between the adversary and facility response after detection has occurred. For MC&A activities, the race is between the stages of an insider theft scenario and the MC&A "sensor" systems that transition a facility from a normal state to a heightened alert state having additional detection opportunities. MC&A activities contribute to the effectiveness of the facility protection system by providing alerts that material may be missing. While timely detection for a PPS depends on detection, delay and response that interrupts and neutralizes an attack from an outside adversary, timely detection for MC&A activities depends on detecting that material is not where it should be and providing an alert. The mathematics for probabilistic convolution provide a basis to determine the probability that an MC&A alert (detection) occurs before the insider moves the material past a given physical protection layer. The effectiveness of MC&A activities can be determined by convolving the probability distributions for the MC&A detection timeline with the insider theft timeline to determine the probability that detection occurs before the theft of material can be completed.
A. Timely MC&A Detection
In demonstrating the application of HRA methods for determining a probability of detection for the notional MC&A activities above, only the MC&A detection timeline (in this example for a 30-day scenario) was described without considering the insider adversary theft stages. To implement timely detection, the MC&A detection timeline must be convolved against the insider adversary theft timeline. MC&A activities provide recurring opportunities to detect that material is "missing" such that the facility state transition occurs from normal state to alert state. Because MC&A activities are usually discrete observations, discrete mathematics and discrete probability distributions are appropriate. The frequency of recurrence for MC&A activities (Table 2) is determined in days, this formulation uses one day as the discretization time step. Other discretization time steps could also be used if appropriate based on the frequency of MC&A activities or theft opportunities. If material is detected as missing on day n and the material has not been removed from the facility before day n, then detection will be timely. To formulate the probability of timely detection by MC&A activities, P D,Timely is the overall cumulative daily probability of timely detection over the scenario timeline of N days: 
P D,Timely is the sum of MC&A detection that occurs exactly on day n and is timely, that is detection happens before the insider moves the material out of the physical protection layer. P D,Timely,n , the probability of timely detection on a given day n, is given by:
where, P DEn = the probability that the facility detects material is missing on exactly day n P NTn = the probability that the material has not been removed from the facility before day n P NTn is the complementary cumulative probability that the theft occurred on day n, P Tn :
P Tn is the daily probability of theft and is determined from the theft opportunity timeline. For example, if an insider has an equal opportunity to take material once per day over a 30-day time period, then the insider theft timeline is defined as a uniform distribution, and
P Tn is determined for various timeline scenarios based on the type of insider and his or her access to the target material.
Further, because detection on exactly day n implies that the material has not been detected as missing before day n and is detected as missing on day n, P DEn is defined as:
where, P D, MC&A,n = the probability of detection for the MC&A activities on the nth day P ND,n-1 = the probability that the material has not been detected as missing before day n The detection probabilities for MC&A activities can be determined as described previously by characterizing individual activities as associated NPP operations, defining applicable BHEPs, and dependency relationships. The MC&A detection probabilities are the complements of the BHEPs. An MC&A detection timeline for a given scenario is defined as the set of MC&A activities that are performed on a day to day basis.
P ND,n-1 , the probability that the material has not been detected as missing before day n, is defined as:
P D<n is the cumulative probability that the facility detects material is missing (cumulative P DEn ) up to day n-1:
Thus, combining Equations 2 through 8, the overall cumulative daily probability of timely detection over the scenario timeline of N days is given by:
Previous work [3] provides a detailed example calculation of the values for each of the probabilistic parameters required to determine the probability of timely detection for one MC&A activity performed once a day in one physical protection layer over a 30-day time period for a moderate level of dependence between recurrences and a BHEP of 0.98. The associated scenario has the insider adversary's opportunity to remove target material occur once every day, and the adversary will make a decision during this time period as to which day will be most advantageous to remove the material from this physical protection layer. Thus, for this example, the daily probability of insider theft is defined as a uniform distribution. The daily MC&A probability of detection is calculated from Equation (9) with P D, MC&A,n determined by Equation (1) for a=6 and an initial probability of detection equal to 0.02 (1-BHEP). The example scenario is one of several analyses completed to formulate timely MC&A detection. For the 30-day scenario of one daily MC&A activity in one physical protection layer and a uniform insider theft timeline, calculations of timely MC&A detection were also completed for the five different levels of dependence, for a low (0.02), medium (0.50) and high (0.99) initial probability of detection. Figure 2 shows the cumulative daily probability of detection that could be achieved by one daily MC&A activity within one physical protection layer over the scenario timeline. As dependence between MC&A observations decreases, the cumulative daily probability of detection improves significantly over the initial probability of detection, in this case a low initial value of 0.020. Table 3 summarizes the increase in the cumulative daily probability of detection after 30 days for each of the initial probabilities of detection and for each of the five dependence levels.
Because of the multiple detection opportunities, even an activity with a low initial probability of detection can achieve a significantly higher cumulative detection if the adversary timeline is extended and the dependence between recurrence of MC&A activities is reduced. A more than 10-fold increase is evident for an activity that has 0.02 initial probability of detection and zero dependence between recurrences.
The cumulative daily probability of detection is the value that is used for MC&A detection events in each physical protection layer to calculate the overall effectiveness for each adversary path scenario.
The extended path analysis methodology developed in this work includes several elements. An object-based state machine paradigm is applied within which an insider theft scenario races against MC&A "sensor" systems that move a facility from a normal state to a heightened alert state having additional detection opportunities. This object-based state machine provides the framework for addressing the protracted and discontinuous insider theft timelines. Event sequence diagrams (ESDs) describe insider paths of each theft scenario through the PPS and also incorporate MC&A activities as events in each physical protection layer. 
IV. ANALYSIS FOR MULTIPLE PHYSICAL PROTECTION LAYERS
The example above for the formulation of timely detection demonstrates extended path analysis for one daily MC&A event and a single theft timeline that could be incorporated in a single physical protection layer. Figure 3 illustrates an ESD for three physical protection layers and five events -three PPS protection elements and two MC&A activities (gold boxes). The MC&A events are included in each internal physical protection layer in the ESD. Figure 3 also provides an illustration of how the ESD indicates where MC&A activities trigger a change of facility state from normal to "heightened alert," where the facility is searching for "missing" material. This state change is modeled using different detection probabilities for the normal and heightened alert facility states at each detection opportunity. The ESD represents the paths of insider theft, incorporates MC&A activities within each layer, and provides a framework for propagating probability values to determine effectiveness for detecting missing material.
V. ANALYSIS FOR COMBINED MC&A DETECTION
Actual facility-level MC&A operations are much more complex and involve many MC&A activities that are performed at various intervals to provided combined MC&A detection.
To demonstrate the extended path analysis methodology scenarios that are more representative of the complexity of actual facility MC&A operations, additional analyses were done for a 5-day/30-day scenario timeline for PPS layers 1 and 2, respectively, for a set of MC&A activities that occur at different intervals. Table 4 presents 16 days of a detection opportunity timeline for a notional set of four MC&A activities at a facility. Each activity occurs at a different interval and has a BHEP as determined in Table 1 . Also, each activity has been assigned a level of dependence, which is reflected in the day-to-day BHEPs. For example, Activity 3 occurs every three days with a high level of dependence. Activity 2 occurs every 14 days with a moderate level of dependence. In this example, Activities 1 and 4 are performed once a day by the same person, so these activities are assigned a high level of dependence.
The daily P D can be determined by combining the BHEPs as non-detection probabilities and taking the complement: The original MC&A detection timeline was evaluated against an adversary timeline in which MC&A detection in the PPS layer 1 represented as a 5-day uniform distribution and MC&A in PPS layer 2 was represented as a 30-day uniform distribution. For the 5-day timeline, the daily values of MC&A detection for the first five days (Table 4) are used in the convolution calculation. For this case, timely MC&A detection for Event 2 in the ESD is calculated to be 0.98. For the composite timelines, the daily values of MC&A detection for the 35-day composite timeline are used in the convolution calculation, and timely MC&A detection for Event 4 in the ESD is calculated to be 0.938. The sequence probabilities for the Material Recovered and Alert end states are 0.750 and 0.249, respectively. Thus, the set of MC&A activities result in a level of MC&A detection similar to that for a single MC&A activity with a high initial P D , even though some of the MC&A activities in the set have high and moderate levels of dependence between observations and across activities.
This analysis demonstrates the applicability of the extended path analysis methods for more realistic facility conditions. The daily P D in Figure 4 provides insights for evaluating the protection level provided by MC&A activities over time and identifying gaps in that protection level. For example, daily P D from days 15 through 25 indicate that little protection exists during this period. This could be mitigated by reducing dependency among MC&A activities, or by adding other MC&A activities. The importance of MC&A activities is also evidentwhile a single MC&A activity can contribute significantly to cumulative detection, a set of activities has the potential to maintain cumulative detection over time.
A. Mitigating Potential Malicious Insider Activity
Another application of HRA methods in this method was to demonstrate how these methods might be used to explore strategies for mitigating malicious insider activity. This analysis used a 5-day/5-day scenario timeline for PPS layers 1 and 2, respectively, with uniform distributions for the theft timelines and the detection timeline developed for a set of MC&A activities. This scenario timeline has a two-day to ten-day possible duration and 25 possible composite timelines. Three cases for the MC&A detection timeline were addressed: one for the baseline set of combined MC&A activities described in Table 4 ; a second assuming a malicious insider performs activities 1 and 4, which have a high level of dependence; and a third assuming the dependency relationship is removed for activity 4. The baseline case assumes that the insider has access to the material, but is not in a position to perform MC&A tasks.
For the first composite timeline, the detection timeline used daily MC&A detection probabilities from the baseline set of combined MC&A activities (Table 4 ). In this baseline set of activities, activities 1 and 4 are performed daily by the same person, so a high level of dependence exists for these activities. The next variation for this timeline assumes that the person who performs activities 1 and 4 is a malicious insider who is seeking to steal material. Consequently, the BHEP for these activities is set to 1 and the P D is 0 because the thief is concealing the activities by misstating the results of the MC&A tasks. In the third variation, but an operational change is made to remove the dependency between activities 1 and 4 -instead of one person performing both activities, two people perform these activities. The person who performs activity 1 is still assumed to be the malicious insider, and activity 4 is assumed to have the high level of dependence, the same as for the baseline set of activities because a single person (but not the malicious insider) always performs these tasks. Tables 5 and 6 provide the detection timelines for the variations with the malicious insider and the insider mitigation, respectively. Figure 6 is a plot of these detection timelines. The original BHEPs for activities 1 and 4 provided in Table 3 for the set of MC&A activities no longer apply. For the case of the malicious insider, these values in Table 5 are set to 1.0, as the insider who performs both activities is concealing the malicious activity. The P D for these individual activities is zero. Because only activities 1 and 4 occur on days 1 and 2, the daily probability of MC&A detection is also zero. Over the ten-day timeline for this case MC&A detection occurs only on days 3, 6 and 9 when an activity other than 1 or 4 is performed. Activity 3 is performed on these days and has a high level of dependence. For the case with malicious insider mitigation for activity 4, the daily BHEP values reflect the removal of the dependency between activity 1 and activity 4, but there is still a high level of dependence for activity 4 because the same person (although not a malicious insider) always performs this task. The operational change to remove the dependence between activities 1 and 4 helps mitigate possible malicious insider actions and results in additional daily MC&A detection that is at least as high as or higher than the baseline case. Table 7 provides the values for timely MC&A detection in layer 1 and layer 2 and the end state summaries for each of the three cases. These results show that the case for malicious insider mitigation allows overall detection to recover up to the baseline case. These analyses demonstrate the application of the extended path analysis methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of a set of MC&A activities, to identify possible vulnerabilities and to provide insights for operational strategies to address possible malicious insider activity. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This work has provided analyses to demonstrate the extended path analysis methodology for combining MC&A protections with traditional sensor data in a calculation for timely MC&A detection. The analyses presented in this paper demonstrate the use of extended path analysis to model insider theft and integrated PPS and MC&A protection elements and to quantify the effectiveness of these protection elements against an insider threat. The methods provide tools to evaluate the protection level MC&A activities provide over time, identify gaps, and model potential insider activity. The results provide insights on how MC&A activities can be implemented in facility operations to provide a desired level of protection over time. Table 3 no longer apply. For this case of the malicious insider, these values are set to 1.0 for activity 1, as the insider is trying to conceal malicious activity. # For the case with malicious insider mitigation for activity 4, the daily BHEP values reflect the removal of the dependency between activities 1 and 4, but still a high level of dependency between the performance of this activity (always by the same person, but not the malicious insider).
This paper presented analyses for an individual MC&A activity through multiple protections layers as well as a set of MC&A activities through multiple PPS layers that more realistically reflect facility MC&A operations. The analyses demonstrate how operational strategies might be considered for evaluating a set of MC&A protections and for mitigating the insider threat. The approaches used to characterize and evaluate MC&A activities highlight their importance as protection elements.
Overall, this work has identified three key MC&A factors that can be manipulated to enhance the effectiveness of MC&A as a "sensor" within the larger PPS. One can increase the detection probability for each MC&A observation by proper selection of MC&A activities. One can also increase the effectiveness of subsequent observations by reducing the dependence between observations through the use of HRA and human factor techniques. Finally, one can take steps to lengthen the adversary's timeline by reducing the frequency of potentially vulnerable states in order to provide more opportunities for MC&A detection.
These methods are most applicable for protracted theft and discontinuous timeline scenarios -current methods are adequate for abrupt theft scenarios. Explicitly incorporating MC&A protection into the existing path analysis evaluation provides the basis for an effectiveness measure for insider threats. The resulting P E calculations provide an integrated effectiveness measure that addresses both outsider and insider threats. 
